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Abstract
We analyze a mean field tournament: a mean field game in which the agents receive rewards
according to the ranking of the terminal value of their projects and are subject to cost of effort.
Using Schro¨dinger bridges we are able to explicitly calculate the equilibrium. This allows us to
identify the reward functions which would yield a desired equilibrium and solve several related
mechanism design problems. We are also able to identify the effect of reward inequality on the
players’ welfare as well as calculate the price of anarchy.
Keywords: Tournaments, rank-based rewards, mechanism design, mean field games, price of
anarchy, Schro¨dinger bridges, Lorenz order.
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1 Introduction
Consider the following tournament: each player (indexed by i ∈ {1, . . . , N}) exerts an effort,
which we denote by ai, to move the value of her project/state, which is modeled as a drifted
Brownian motion:
Xi,t = x0 +
∫ t
0
ai,sds+ σBi,t.
We assume B1, . . . , BN are independent. The cost of effort per unit time is assumed to be quadratic
in ai with coefficient c. The game ends at time T > 0, when each player receives a reward that is
a deterministic function of three components:
• Her terminal project value Xi,T ;
• The ranking of Xi,T relative to other players, measured by the fraction 1N
∑N
j=1 1{Xj,T≤Xi,T }
of players having equal or worse performance (so that the top performer has rank one and
the bottom performer has rank 1/N);
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• Statistics of the population performance, such as population mean 1N
∑N
j=1Xj,T or the k-th
order statistic of X1,T , . . . ,XN,T or both. This allows us to cover the case when the “reward
pie” is not fixed, but grows with the total production or the k-th best performance. For
simplicity of the presentation, we only consider dependence via the population mean.
In this paper, we will analyze themean field game associated with the above N -player game, and
explicitly characterize the equilibrium (see Section 3), improving on the results of Bayraktar and
Zhang [2] which dealt only with the abstract existence and uniqueness of the mean-field equilibrium.
Analysis of mean-field games is useful in solving N -player games when N is large, since it has been
shown in Bayraktar and Zhang [2] that the mean-field equilibrium can be used to construct an
approximate Nash equilibria for the finite player games.
Our explicit characterization, which is rare in mean field games, allows us to solve tournament
design problems. Specifically, we determine in Section 5 the reward functions that maximize the
rank-α performance, the net profit (for the tournament planner), and the total effort, respectively.
Moreover, in Section 6, we also compute the so-called price of anarchy which measures the efficiency
loss due to decentralization; see e.g. Lacker and Ramanan [13], Carmona et al. [5], and Cardaliaguet
and Rainer [3].
Mean field games, introduced simultaneously by Lasry and Lions [14, 15, 16], and Huang, Caines
and Malhame´ [12, 11] (see also the two-volume book of Carmona and Delarue [4] for an extensive
overview), analyze games with a large number of players which are weakly interacting through their
empirical distribution. The main appeal of the mean field games is the decentralized structure of
their equilibria: agents compute their best response to a given population distribution, which is
then determined by a fixed point problem. The best response calculation is a pure stochastic
control problem. Instead of working with the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, we perform the
calculation using Schro¨dinger bridges which can be seen as the stochastic analogue of quadratic
optimal transport. (See Le´onard [18] and Chen et al. [7] for an overview of Schro¨dinger bridges
and their connection to optimal transport.) We first introduce an auxiliary terminal distribution
for the state (to convert the problem to an optimal transport problem), and then optimize over all
such terminal distributions. This approach allows us to reformulate the best response problem as
a static calculus of variation problem, which we then explicitly solve. This leads us to the next
stage, the fixed point equation, whose solutions can be explicitly determined through its quantiles.
The distinguishing feature of our mean field game, i.e., tournament, is the rank-based feature
of the reward. In particular, each player is rewarded according to the ranking of the terminal
value of their project relative to the population, subject to cost of effort. This makes the analysis
of the problem more difficult since the mean field interaction is non-local in the measure and the
rank function is not regular. This problem was suggested by Gue´ant et al. [10] as a model in
oil production, analyzed using abstract tools in the weak formulation by Carmona and Lacker [6]
and in the strong formulation by Bayraktar and Zhang [2]. In these works continuity with respect
to the rank was assumed. Related tournament games where the players are ranked according
to their completion times have been considered by Bayraktar et al. [1] for controlled Brownian
motion dynamics and by Nutz and Zhang [21] for one-stage Poisson dynamics with controlled jump
intensity. In the Appendix we are going to construct an extension of Schro¨dinger bridges from
space to time which can then be applied to construct the equilibrium in Bayraktar et al. [1] as well.
In economics there is a substantial literature on tournaments, going back to Lazear and Rosen
[17]; see Bayraktar et al. [1] for a review. Most of these works focus on finitely many players or
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static models. Using such a one shot model, Fang et al. [8] analyze the discouraging effects of
inequality. In our paper we observe a similar phenomenon, in that the more unequal the reward
is (in the Lorenz order, see e.g. Marshall et al. [20]) the smaller the game value for each player.
However, unlike in the work of Fang et al. [8], the same is not true for the effort in our set-up: the
most fair distribution induces agents to put forth zero effort. Hence, one of the questions in the
mechanism design section we investigate is what reward function maximizes the cumulative effort.
We also analyze the case when agents have a social planner doing the optimization, which is used
in computing the price of anarchy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we consider the single player’s problem
and find her best response using Schro¨dinger bridges. We then explicitly compute the mean field
equilibrium in Section 3 and show the effect of reward inequality on the well-being of the players
in Section 4. Section 5 is where we investigate the tournament design problems with respect to
several criteria. In Section 6 we compute the price of anarchy. Finally, in Appendix A we show how
one can adapt the Schro¨dinger bridge approach to the completion time ranking game of Bayraktar
et al. [1].
2 A single player’s problem
Let us first describe the incentives of the player: We call R(x, r,m) : R× [0, 1]×R→ R∪{±∞}
a reward function if it is increasing in all of its arguments1, R-valued if r ∈ (0, 1), and satisfies∫ 1
0 R(x, r,m)dr < ∞ for all (x,m) ∈ R2. Denote the set of reward functions by R and the set of
bounded reward functions by Rb.
Given the distribution µ˜ ∈ P(R) of the terminal project value of the population, we wish to find
the best response to µ˜ for a representative player. For any µ ∈ P(R), write Fµ for the cumulative
distribution function (c.d.f.) of µ and Rµ(x) for R(x, Fµ(x),
∫
R
ydµ(y)). A representative player
with cost parameter c solves the following stochastic control problem:
sup
a
E
[
Rµ˜(XT )−
∫ T
0
ca2t dt
]
where Xt = x0 +
∫ t
0
asds+ σBt. (2.1)
Here a is admissible if it is progressively measurable and satisfies E
∫ T
0 |as|ds <∞. Different from
Bayraktar and Zhang [2], let us consider the weak formulation of the above problem, which has
some interesting connection with optimal transport.
Let Ω = C([0, T ],R) be the Wiener space and Wx be the Wiener measure starting at x at t = 0.
Under W0, the canonical process ωt is a Brownian motion, and thus Xt := x0 + σωt represents the
project value process under zero effort. Let P be the law of X under W0, and (Ft)t∈[0,T ] be the
filtration generated by the process ωt.
For any Q ∈ P(Ω) such that Q ∼ P , the Girsanov theorem implies that we can find an adapted
process at such that
dXt = atdt+ σdB
Q
t
for some Q-Brownian motion BQ. Conversely, given any sufficiently integrable adapted process at,
we can define Q ∼ P such that the above equation holds. This means that if we restrict ourselves
1Throughout the paper, increasing and decreasing are understood in the weak sense.
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to sufficiently integrable effort process, we can identify Q := {Q ∈ P(Ω) : Q ∼ P} with the set of
laws of the controlled project value process X. Moreover, let H(·|·) denote the relative entropy,
with the convention that H(Q|P ) = ∞ if Q is not absolutely continuous with respect to P . We
have
H(Q|P ) := EQ
[
ln
(
dQ
dP
)]
=
1
2cσ2
EQ
[∫ T
0
ca2t dt
]
. (2.2)
Thus, we take the following as our definition of the single player’s control problem:
V (R, µ˜) := sup
Q∈Q
EQ [Rµ˜(XT )]− 2cσ2H(Q|P ), Xt = x0 + σωt. (2.3)
Remark 2.1. Here to keep notation simple, we define the filtration to be the one generated by the
canonical process, but similar to Bayraktar et al. [1, Remark 2.1], all results remain valid if we take
(Ft) to be a larger filtration for which ωt remains a Brownian motion.
2.1 Reduction via Schro¨dinger bridges
Let Xt = x0 + σωt and P = W0 ◦X−1 as before; P will serve as our reference measure.2 For
any Q ∈ P(Ω), write Qt for the time-t marginal of Q, and Q0,T for the joint distribution of Q at
time 0 and T . Given a source distribution ν = δx0 and a target distribution µ, the Schro¨dinger
bridge problem looks for an entropy-minimizing transport from ν to µ:
minimize
Q∈P(Ω)
H(Q|P ) subject to Q0 = ν, QT = µ, (2.4)
It is known, by a simple disintegration, that the solution to the Schro¨dinger bridge problem is given
by (see Fo¨llmer [9] and also Le´onard [18], Chen et al. [7])
Q∗(·) =
∫
R2
P x,y(·)π∗(dx, dy),
where P x,y := P (·|X0 = x,XT = y) is the law of a scaled Brownian bridge (scaled by σ), and π∗ is
the solution to the following static optimization, assuming it exists:
minimize
pi∈P(R2)
H(π|P0,T ) subject to π0 = ν, πT = µ. (2.5)
In addition, it holds that H(Q∗|P ) = H(π∗|P0,T ). Since ν = P0 = δx0 , the static problem (2.5) is
trivial, giving a minimum entropy of H(µ|N (x0, σ2T )).
Going back to our control problem (2.3), by splitting the optimization over Q to a maximization
over its time-T marginal plus a constrained entropy minimization, we can utilize the equivalence
2In standard Schro¨dinger bridge problem, the reference measure P is usually taken to be the stationary Wiener
measure
∫
Wxdx, but the disintegration argument works for any non-zero, non-negative, σ-finite measure on Ω.
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between (2.4) and (2.5) and obtain
V (R, µ˜) = sup
µ∈P(R): µ∼PT
sup
Q∈Q:QT=µ
∫
R
Rµ˜(x)dµ(x)− 2cσ2H(Q|P )
≤ sup
µ∈P(R): µ∼PT
sup
Q∈P(Ω):Q0=ν,QT=µ
∫
R
Rµ˜(x)dµ(x)− 2cσ2H(Q|P )
= sup
µ∈P(R): µ∼PT
∫
R
Rµ˜(x)dµ(x) − 2cσ2 inf
Q∈P(Ω):Q0=ν, QT=µ
H(Q|P )
= sup
µ∈P(R): µ∼PT
∫
R
Rµ˜(x)dµ(x) − 2cσ2 inf
pi∈P(R2): pi0=ν, piT=µ
H(π|P0,T )
= sup
µ∈P(R): µ∼PT
∫
R
Rµ˜(x)dµ(x) − 2cσ2H(µ|N (x0, σ2T )).
Since
∫
R2
P x0,y(·)µ(dy) ∈ Q for any µ ∼ PT , the inequality is in fact an equality. Thus,
V (R, µ˜) = sup
µ∈P(R): µ∼PT
∫
R
Rµ˜(x)dµ(x) − 2cσ2H(µ|N (x0, σ2T )). (2.6)
Let ϕ be the standard normal probability density function (p.d.f.) and introduce
f0(x) :=
1
σ
√
T
ϕ
(
x− x0
σ
√
T
)
. (2.7)
We finally arrive at a constrained calculus of variation problem over the p.d.f. of µ:
V (R, µ˜) = sup
fµ>0:
∫
R
fµ(x)dx=1
∫
R
{
Rµ˜(x)− 2cσ2 ln
(
fµ(x)
f0(x)
)}
fµ(x)dx. (2.8)
which can be easily solved by the method of Lagrange multipliers.3 The solution is provided
below without proof. Once we find the optimal marginal µ∗, we can recover Q∗ by Q∗(·) =∫
R2
P x0,y(·)µ∗(dy).
Proposition 2.1. Given R ∈ R and µ˜ ∈ P(R). Let
β(µ˜) :=
∫
R
f0(y) exp
(
Rµ˜(y)
2cσ2
)
dy,
where f0 is defined in (2.7). Suppose β(µ˜) <∞. Then the optimal terminal distribution µ∗ of the
single player has p.d.f.
fµ∗(x) =
1
β(µ˜)
f0(x) exp
(
Rµ˜(x)
2cσ2
)
. (2.9)
The optimal value is given by V (R, µ˜) = 2cσ2 ln β(µ˜).
Remark 2.2. The Schro¨dinger bridge approach can also be adapted to the hitting time ranking
game of Bayraktar et al. [1]. This calls for a variant of the Schro¨dinger bridge problem where the
target distribution is not the time-T marginal, but the law of first passage time of level zero. We
detail this digression in the appendix for the interested readers.
3Alternatively, one can directly drop the integral constraint, by observing that any non-negative function f 6≡ 0
can be normalized to have integral equal to one.
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Remark 2.3. The model assumption that XT has a Gaussian W0-density is not essential in the
best-response step; what matters is that the cost of effort can be written as a relative entropy H(Q|P )
where P and Q are the laws of the state process X corresponding to zero effort and general effort,
respectively. Suppose the W0-distribution of XT is µ0. Using the equivalence between the dynamic
and static Schro¨dinger bridge problems, equations (2.6) and (2.8) hold with N (x0, σ2T ) replaced by
µ0 and fµ replaced by z = dµ/dµ0:
V (R, µ˜) = sup
µ∈P(R):µ∼µ0
∫
R
Rµ˜(x)dµ(x) − 2cσ2H(µ|µ0)
= sup
z(x)>0,
∫
z(x)dµ0(x)=1
∫
R
(
Rµ˜(x)− 2cσ2 ln z(x)
)
z(x)dµ0(x).
Using the method of Lagrange multipliers, one finds that the optimal µ∗ is given by
dµ∗
dµ0
(x) =
exp
(
Rµ˜(x)
2cσ2
)
∫
exp
(
Rµ˜(y)
2cσ2
)
dµ0(y)
,
which is similar to (2.9). The derivation of the fixed point (see the proof of Theorem 3.2), on the
other hand, relies on the existence of a density, but not on the Gaussian property.
2.2 Optimal effort
The Schro¨dinger bridge approach allows us to compute the optimal target distribution easily,
which is all we need to analyze equilibrium measures (see Section 3 for details). On the other hand,
to get a more explicit description of the optimal effort, ideally as a feedback function a∗(t, x) of
time and state, we still need to go back to the dynamic control formulation of the Schro¨dinger
bridge problem. We can utilize some existing results in, for example, Chen et al. [7].
Recall that under the reference measure P , the canonical process is a scaled Brownian motion
with transition density
p(t, x, s, y) :=
1
σ
√
s− tϕ
(
y − x
σ
√
s− t
)
.
Note that f0(y) = p(0, x0, T, y). Define
ψ(t, x) :=
∫
R
p(t, x, T, y)
fµ∗(y)
f0(y)
dy, ψˆ(t, x) = p(0, x0, t, x).
It can be easily checked that ψ, ψˆ satisfy ψ(0, x)ψˆ(0, x) = δx0(x), ψ(T, x)ψˆ(T, x) = fµ∗(x),
ψ(t, x) =
∫
R
p(t, x, T, y)ψ(T, y)dy, and ψˆ(t, x) =
∫
R
p(0, y, t, x)ψˆ(0, y)dy.
By Chen et al. [7, p. 679-680], the optimal coupling Q∗ has Markovian drift a∗ given by
a∗(t, x) = σ2∂x lnψ(t, x).
4
4Chen et al. [7] assumes σ = 1, but the proof can be easily generalized to nonzero σ.
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Using (2.9), we obtain
ψ(t, x) =
1
β(µ˜)
E
[
exp
(
Rµ˜(x+ σ
√
T − tZ)
2cσ2
)]
, Z ∼ N (0, 1).
Comparing with Bayraktar and Zhang [2, eq. (3.3)], we see that u(t, x) := β(µ˜)ψ(t, x) is precisely
the Cole-Hopf transformation of the value function of the original control problem (2.1). Replacing
ψ by u, we recover the same optimal Markovian control as Bayraktar and Zhang [2]:
a∗(t, x) = σ2
ux(t, x)
u(t, x)
. (2.10)
When R is bounded, it is shown in Bayraktar and Zhang [2] that limx→±∞ a
∗(t, x) = 0, meaning
players show slackness when having a very big lead, and give up when falling far behind.
Remark 2.4. For bounded rewards, Bayraktar and Zhang [2] also showed that the controlled dif-
fusion dXt = a
∗(t,Xt)dt + σdBt in fact has a unique strong solution. From there, one can mimic
the change of measure technique in Bayraktar et al. [1] to obtain the optimal terminal distribution
(2.9). An advantage of the weak formulation, beside the connection to optimal transport theory, is
that it avoids the hassle of having to verify the regularity of a∗ near x = 0.
3 Characterization of equilibrium
We say µ ∈ P(R) is an equilibrium (terminal distribution) if it is a fixed point of the best
response mapping: µ˜ 7→ QT , where Q ∈ Q is the optimal control for V (R, µ˜). By (2.9), we have
the following characterization for general rewards functions.
Theorem 3.1. Let R ∈ R and µ ∈ P(R) satisfy
β(µ) =
∫
R
f0(y) exp
(
Rµ(y)
2cσ2
)
dy <∞.
(The above condition always holds when R ∈ Rb.) Then µ is an equilibrium if and only if it has a
strictly positive density satisfying
fµ(x) =
1
β(µ)
f0(x) exp
(
Rµ(x)
2cσ2
)
. (3.1)
The associated game value is given by V (R,µ) = 2cσ2 ln β(µ).
Specializing to the subclass of reward functions
Rrmb := {R ∈ Rb : R(x, r,m) is independent of x and continuous in m},
we obtain a semi-explicit characterization.
Theorem 3.2. Suppose R ∈ Rrmb . Then there exists at least one equilibrium. µ ∈ P(R) is an
equilibrium terminal distribution of the project value if and only if its quantile function qµ satisfies
qµ(r) = x0 + σ
√
TN−1


∫ r
0 exp
(
−R(z,mµ)
2cσ2
)
dz∫ 1
0 exp
(
−R(z,mµ)2cσ2
)
dz

 , (3.2)
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where N(·) is the standard normal c.d.f. and mµ =
∫∞
−∞ ydµ(y) is a solution of
m = x0 + σ
√
T
∫ 1
0
N−1


∫ r
0 exp
(
−R(z,m)
2cσ2
)
dz∫ 1
0 exp
(
−R(z,m)
2cσ2
)
dz

 dr. (3.3)
The associated game value is given by
V (R,µ) = 2cσ2 ln β(µ) = −2cσ2 ln
(∫ 1
0
exp
(
−R(z,mµ)
2cσ2
)
dz
)
.
Proof. Since R is bounded, we only need to look for solutions of the fixed point equation (3.1). Let
y(·) be the c.d.f. of the random variable Fµ(N (x0, σ2
√
T )), i.e.
y(r) = N
(
qµ(r)− x0
σ
√
T
)
.
Since any fixed point µ has a positive density, we can differentiate y(r) and use (3.1) to get
y′(r) = ϕ
(
qµ(r)− x0
σ
√
T
)
1
σ
√
T
1
fµ(qµ(r))
=
f0(qµ(r))
fµ(qµ(r))
= β(µ) exp
(
−Rµ(qµ(r))
2cσ2
)
= β(µ) exp
(
−R(r,mµ)
2cσ2
)
.
Using y(0) = 0 and y(1) = 1, we find that
y(r) = β(µ)
∫ r
0
exp
(
−R(z,mµ)
2cσ2
)
dz,
and
β(µ) =
(∫ 1
0
exp
(
−R(z,mµ)
2cσ2
)
dz
)−1
.
It follows that
N
(
qµ(r)− x0
σ
√
T
)
= y(r) =
∫ r
0 exp
(
−R(z,mµ)
2cσ2
)
dz∫ 1
0 exp
(
−R(z,mµ)
2cσ2
)
dz
,
from which we get (3.2). To determine mµ, we integrate (3.2) from r = 0 to r = 1 and use that
mµ =
∫ 1
0 qµ(r)dr. This leads to equation (3.3). It remains to show that (3.3) has a solution.
Let g(m) be the right hand side of (3.3). We want to show g has a fixed point. Since R is
bounded, it can be shown that C−1 ≤ y′(r) ≤ C where
C = exp
(‖R(1,m)−R(0,m)‖∞
2cσ2
)
.
It follows that∣∣∣∣g(m)− x0σ√T
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣
∫ 1
0
N−1(y(r))dr
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣
∫ 1
0
N−1(y)
dy
y′(r)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ C
∫ 1
0
∣∣N−1(y)∣∣ dy = C
√
2
π
.
So the range of g is contained in a compact interval. Moreover, g is continuous on this interval since
R is assumed to be continuous in m. By Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, g has a fixed point.
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Remark 3.1. Observe that the equilibrium distribution µ does not change if we add any bounded
function κ(m) to the reward. In other words, any bounded compensation that is solely based on the
mean performance of the population does not really incentivize the players.
Remark 3.2. When R ∈ Rrmb is further independent of m (i.e. purely rank-based), the equilibrium
is unique. In this case, the total effort of the population (or the expected cumulative effort of a
representative player) is given by
A(R) := E
∫ T
0
a∗(t,X∗t )dt = mµ − x0 = σ
√
T
∫ 1
0
N−1


∫ r
0 exp
(
−R(z)
2cσ2
)
dz∫ 1
0 exp
(
−R(z)
2cσ2
)
dz

 dr.
Remark 3.3. If we confine ourselves to the subclass of equilibria which satisfy β(µ) <∞, then all
results in this section can be restated with R ∈ Rrm which is obtained from Rrmb by dropping the
boundedness requirement.
In the next two sections, we focus on bounded rewards that are purely rank-based:
Rrb := {R ∈ Rb : R(x, r,m) is independent of x and m}.
Each of these rewards induces a unique equilibrium, which facilitates the study of comparative
statics and optimal reward design. In this case, we write V(R) for the unique game value.
4 Effect of reward inequality
Definition 4.1. Given two reward functions R, R˜ ∈ Rrb, we say R is more unequal than R˜ in
Lorenz order (or R majorizes R˜), written as R ≻ R˜, if ∫ 10 R(r)dr = ∫ 10 R˜(r)dr and∫ z
0
R(r)dr ≤
∫ z
0
R˜(r)dr ∀ z ∈ [0, 1].
Theorem 4.1. Suppose R, R˜ ∈ Rrb and R ≻ R˜, then the associated game values satisfy V(R) ≤
V(R˜); that is, reward inequality decreases the game value.
Proof. First assume R, R˜ ∈ Rrn, where Rrn is the set of piecewise constant reward functions of the
form
R(r) =
n∑
i=1
Ri1{(i−1)/n≤r<i/n} +Rn1{r=1}.
In this case, the Lorenz order translates to
∑n
i=1Ri =
∑n
i=1 R˜i and
∑k
i=1Ri ≤
∑k
i=1 R˜i for all
k ∈ {1, . . . , n}; that is, (R1, . . . , Rn) majorizes (R˜1, . . . , R˜n). By Marshall et al. [20, Proposition
4.B.1], R˜ ≺ R if and only if ∑ni=1 g(R˜i) ≤∑ni=1 g(Ri) for all continuous convex functions g. Take
g(x) = exp(− x2cσ2 ), we obtain∫ 1
0
exp
(
− R˜(r)
2cσ2
)
dr =
1
n
n∑
i=1
g(R˜i) ≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
g(Ri) =
∫ 1
0
exp
(
−R(r)
2cσ2
)
dr,
which is equivalent to V(R˜) ≥ V(R). This finishes the proof for piecewise constant reward functions.
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For general R, R˜ ∈ Rrb , we approximate V(R) and V(R˜) by the Riemann sums V(R(n)) and
V(R˜(n)), respectively, where R(n), R˜(n) ∈ Rrn. Moreover, by the mean value theorem, R(n), R˜(n)
can always be chosen to satisfy
∑k
i=1R
(n)
i =
∫ k/n
0 R(r)dr and
∑k
i=1 R˜
(n)
i =
∫ k/n
0 R˜(r)dr for all
k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. This ensures that the discretization preserves the Lorenz order. The result then
follows from the previous step and passing to the limit.
Remark 4.1. The maximum game value is attained by the most equal reward function, namely,
the uniform reward. This can also be directly seen from Jenssen’s inequality:
∫ 1
0
exp
(
−R(r)
2cσ2
)
dr ≥ exp
(
−
∫ 1
0 R(r)dr
2cσ2
)
,
with equality attained if and only if R is constant. From another perspective, the expected reward in
equilibrium is always equal to
∫ 1
0 R(r)dr by symmetry, while the expected cost of effort is minimized
to zero under the uniform reward, when nobody exerts any effort. Since uniform reward induces
zero effort, the expected total effort clearly does not have the same monotonicity as the game value
with respect to reward inequality (cf. Section 5.4).
5 Tournament design
Denote the mapping from R ∈ Rrb to the unique equilibrium µ by
E : Rrb → P(R).
From (3.2), we see that E is translation invariant, i.e. E(R + C) = E(R) for any constant C. Let
P+(R) be the set of probability measures on R that have strictly positive density. For µ ∈ P+(R),
define the normalized density
ζµ := fµ/f0.
5.1 Realizing a target equilibrium distribution
Suppose the principal has in mind a target distribution µ of the terminal project value in
equilibrium. He wants to know whether that is feasible via a purely rank-based reward, and if yes,
how should he design the reward to achieve it? The following theorem completely characterizes the
set of feasible equilibria and the reward functions that induce them.
Theorem 5.1.
(i) The set of equilibria attainable by a purely rank-based reward is given by
E(Rrb) = {µ ∈ P+(R) : ζµ, 1/ζµ are bounded and ζµ is increasing}.
(ii) If µ ∈ E(Rrb), then
E−1(µ) = {2cσ2 ln ζµ(qµ(r)) + C : C ∈ R}.
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(iii) Suppose we impose additional reservation “utility” constraint V(R) ≥ V0 and budget constraint∫ 1
0 R(r)dr ≤ K, then the constant C in (ii) is restricted to
V0 ≤ C ≤ K − 2cσ2H
(
µ|N (x0, σ2T )
)
,
where
H
(
µ|N (x0, σ2T )
)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
ln ζµ(y)dµ(y) =
∫ 1
0
ln ζµ(qµ(r))dr.
In particular, such a C exists if and only if
H
(
µ|N (x0, σ2T )
) ≤ K − V0
2cσ2
.
Proof. (i) From Theorem 3.1, we know that the normalized density ζµ of any equilibrium µ is
increasing and log-bounded. Conversely, given any µ ∈ P+(R) with such properties, it is easy to
check that µ satisfies (3.2) with purely rank-based reward function R0(r) = 2cσ
2 ln ζµ(qµ(r)):
∫ r
0 exp
(
−2cσ2 ln ζµ(qµ(z))
2cσ2
)
dz∫ 1
0 exp
(
−2cσ2 ln ζµ(qµ(z))2cσ2
)
dz
=
∫ r
0 (ζµ(qµ(z)))
−1 dz∫ 1
0 (ζµ(qµ(z)))
−1 dz
=
∫ qµ(r)
−∞
1
ζµ(y)
dµ(y)∫∞
−∞
1
ζµ(y)
dµ(y)
= N
(
qµ(r)− x0
σ
√
T
)
.
(ii) If R(r) is another function in Rrb that attains µ in equilibrium, then
N
(
y − x0
σ
√
T
)
=
∫ Fµ(y)
0 exp
(
−R(z)2cσ2
)
dz∫ 1
0 exp
(
−R(z)
2cσ2
)
dz
by (3.2). Differentiating both sides with respect to y and setting y = qµ(r), we obtain∫ 1
0
exp
(
−R(z)
2cσ2
)
dz = ζµ(qµ(r)) exp
(
−R(r)
2cσ2
)
= exp
(
R0(r)−R(r)
2cσ2
)
.
Since the left hand side is independent of r, R−R0 must be constant.
(iii) Let R(r) = R0(r) + C be a reward function realizing µ in equilibrium. By Theorem 3.2,
the game value V(R) = V(R0) + C = C. Hence V(R) ≥ V0 if and only if C ≥ V0. We also have∫ 1
0
R(r)dr = C +
∫ 1
0
2cσ2 ln ζµ(qµ(r))dr = C + 2cσ
2H
(
µ|N (x0, σ2T )
)
.
So
∫ 1
0 R(r)dr ≤ K if and only if C ≤ K − 2cσ2H
(
µ|N (x0, σ2T )
)
.
Theorem 5.1 allows us to convert many optimal reward design problems into problems about
finding the optimal target equilibrium distribution. We gave three solvable examples below.
11
5.2 Maximizing rank-α performance
Fix a number α ∈ (0, 1), a reservation utility V0 and a budget K ≥ V0. We look for a reward
function R ∈ Rrb which meets both the reservation utility requirement and the budget constraint,
and which maximizes the α-quantile of E(R). Define the set of feasible reward functions by
H :=
{
R ∈ Rrb :
∫ 1
0
R(r)dr ≤ K and V(R) = V (R, E(R)) ≥ V0
}
.
The optimization problem reads
Q(α) := sup
R∈H
qE(R)(α).
Theorem 5.2. The optimal quantile Q(α) is uniquely attained (up to a.e. equivalence) by the step
function
R∗(r) = V0 +
{
2cσ2 ln αxα , 0 ≤ r < α,
2cσ2 ln 1−α1−xα , α ≤ r ≤ 1,
where xα is the unique solution in [α, 1) to the equation
α ln
α
x
+ (1− α) ln 1− α
1− x =
K − V0
2cσ2
.
Let µ∗ = E(R∗) and f0 be given by (2.7). We have
Q(α) = qµ∗(α) = x0 + σ
√
TN−1 (xα) ,
and
fµ∗(x) =
{
α
xα
f0(x), x < Q(α),
1−α
1−xα
f0(x), x > Q(α).
Proof. By Theorem 5.1, µ ∈ E(H) if and only if µ ∈ E(Rrb) and
H
(
µ|N (x0, σ2T )
)
=
∫ 1
0
ln ζµ(qµ(r))dr ≤ K − V0
2cσ2
. (5.1)
So we can equivalently formulate the optimization problem as one having µ as the decision variable,
qµ(α) as the objective function, and µ ∈ E(Rrb) and (5.1) as the constraints.
Maximizing qµ(α) is equivalent to maximizing
N
(
qµ(α)− x0
σ
√
T
)
=
∫ qµ(α)
−∞
1
σ
√
T
ϕ
(
y − x0
σ
√
T
)
dy
=
∫ α
0
1
σ
√
T
ϕ
(
qµ(r)− x0
σ
√
T
)
dr
fµ(qµ(r))
=
∫ α
0
dr
ζµ(qµ(r))
.
For any feasible equilibrium distribution µ, let h := 1/(ζµ ◦ qµ) which implies ζµ = 1/(h ◦ Fµ),∫ 1
0 h(r)dr = 1, and µ = E(−2cσ2 lnh). In particular, the mapping from µ to h is one-to-one.
Further rewrite the optimization problem as
maximize J (h) =
∫ α
0
h(r)dr s.t.
∫ 1
0
− lnh(r)dr ≤ K − V0
2cσ2
and
∫ 1
0
h(r)dr = 1, (5.2)
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where h is also constrained to be positive, decreasing, bounded and bounded away from zero, as
translated from µ ∈ E(Rrb). Each feasible µ clearly induces a feasible h. Conversely, for any feasible
h, define µ = E(−2cσ2 lnh). Then −2cσ2 lnh(r) = 2cσ2 ln ζµ(qµ(r)) + C for some constant C by
Theorem 5.1. Together with the constraints in (5.2), we find that h = 1/(ζµ ◦ qµ) and that µ is
feasible. Thus, the mapping from feasible µ to feasible h is in fact bijective, which implies that it
suffices for us to solve problem (5.2). Any optimal h induces an optimal µ = E(−2cσ2 lnh) which
can be realized by the reward function
R = V0 − 2cσ2 lnh.
Here we have added the constant V0 to −2cσ2 lnh to ensure that R ∈ H. The rest of the proof is
devoted to solving the equivalent problem (5.2).
We first show that the constant xα given in the theorem statement is well-defined. Let
g(x) := α ln
α
x
+ (1− α) ln 1− α
1− x , 0 < x < 1.
It can be shown that g(x) is strictly decreasing on (0, α) and strictly increasing on (α, 1), hence
has a global minimum at x = α with g(α) = 0. Moreover, g(x)→∞ as x→ 0 or 1. Since K ≥ V0,
by intermediate value theorem, the equation
g(x) =
K − V0
2cσ2
has at least one solution. When K = V0, x = α is the unique solution. When K > V0, there are
two solutions: one in (0, α) and the other in (α, 1). In both cases. xα ∈ [α, 1) is well-defined.
Next, we show that
h∗(r) :=
{
xα
α , 0 ≤ r < α,
1−xα
1−α , α ≤ r ≤ 1.
is the unique optimizer of problem (5.2). Since 0 < α ≤ xα < 1, it is clear that h∗ is decreasing,
bounded and bounded away from zero. Straightforward calculation also shows that∫ 1
0
− lnh∗(r)dr = g(xα) = K − V0
2cσ2
and
∫ 1
0
h∗(r)dr = 1.
Therefore, h∗ satisfies all the feasibility constraints. Given any other feasible h. We have, by
repeated application of Jensen’s inequality, that
− ln
(
1
α
∫ α
0
h(r)dr
)
≤ 1
α
∫ α
0
− lnh(r)dr = 1
α
(∫ 1
0
− lnh(r)dr −
∫ 1
α
− lnh(r)dr
)
≤ 1
α
(
K − V0
2cσ2
−
∫ 1
α
− lnh(r)dr
)
=
K − V0
2αcσ2
+
1− α
α
1
1− α
∫ 1
α
lnh(r)dr
≤ K − V0
2αcσ2
+
1− α
α
ln
(
1
1− α
∫ 1
α
h(r)dr
)
=
K − V0
2αcσ2
+
1− α
α
ln
(
1
1− α
(
1−
∫ α
0
h(r)dr
))
.
That is
g(J (h)) ≤ K − V0
2cσ2
= g(xα).
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We claim that J (h) ≤ xα = J (h∗). Suppose on the contrary that J (h) > xα. Then since xα ≥ α
and g is strictly increasing on (α, 1), we must have g(J (h)) > g(xα), which is a contradiction.
Thus, we have proved that h∗ is optimal. In fact, h∗ is the unique optimizer, since J (h) = J (h∗)
would imply all Jensen’s inequalities above are equalities. This holds if and only if h is constant
on [0, α) and (α, 1]. We then use J (h) = J (h∗) = xα and
∫ 1
0 h(r)dr = 1 to deduce that h = h
∗.
Finally, we argue that the optimal reward function R∗ = V0 − 2cσ2 lnh∗ induced by h∗ is also
unique. Because of the bijection between µ and h, we know that µ∗ = E(−2cσ2 lnh∗) is the unique
optimal equilibrium distribution. Note that H
(
µ∗|N (x0, σ2T )
)
=
∫ 1
0 − lnh∗(r)dr = K−V02cσ2 . By
Theorem 5.1,
E−1(µ∗) ∩H = {C − 2cσ2 lnh∗ : V0 ≤ C ≤ K − 2cσ2H
(
µ∗|N (x0, σ2T )
)} = {R∗}.
The remaining theorem statements follow from direct calculation.
Remark 5.1. One can also replace the reservation utility constraint by the hard constraint: R ≥ R0.
Similar to Bayraktar et al. [1, Theorem 6.2], the optimal reward function in this case is the equal
reward with cutoff rank α, i.e. R(r) = R0 +
K−R0
1−α 1[α,1](r).
5.3 Maximizing net profit
Suppose each terminal output y generates a profit g(y) for the principal, where g is a bounded
increasing function. The goal is to find R ∈ Rrb such that V(R) ≥ V0 and the net profit∫ ∞
−∞
g(y)dE(R)(y) −
∫ 1
0
R(r)dr
is maximized.
Theorem 5.3. The optimal net profit is given by∫∞
−∞ exp
(
g(y)
2cσ2
)
f0(y)g(y)dy∫∞
−∞ exp
(
g(y)
2cσ2
)
f0(y)dy
,
and is uniquely attained by
R∗(r) = V0 + g(qµ∗(r))− 2cσ2 ln
(∫ ∞
−∞
exp
(
g(z)
2cσ2
)
f0(z)dz
)
,
where f0 is given by (2.7), and
fµ∗(y) =
exp
(
g(y)
2cσ2
)
f0(y)∫∞
−∞ exp
(
g(z)
2cσ2
)
f0(z)dz
.
Proof. By Theorem 5.1, it suffices for us to look for the optimal µ ∈ E(Rrb) which can then be
realized by R(r) = 2cσ2 ln ζµ(qµ(r)) + C for any C ≥ V0. It is clear that the principal should pick
C = V0 to minimize the cost. Write R
µ(r) = 2cσ2 ln ζµ(qµ(r)) + V0. We then have∫ 1
0
Rµ(r)dr = V0 + 2cσ
2
∫ ∞
−∞
ln
(
fµ(y)
f0(y)
)
fµ(y)dy.
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The optimization problem over µ is given by
maximize
∫ ∞
−∞
g(y)fµ(y)dy − V0 − 2cσ2
∫ ∞
−∞
ln
(
fµ(y)
f0(y)
)
fµ(y)dy
s.t.
∫ ∞
−∞
fµ(y)dy = 1, ln
(
fµ
f0
)
is bounded and increasing.
(5.3)
To solve problem (5.3), we define
L(fµ, λ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
g(y)fµ(y)dy − 2cσ2
∫ ∞
−∞
ln
(
fµ(y)
f0(y)
)
fµ(y)dy + λ
(
1−
∫ ∞
−∞
fµ(y)dy
)
.
For each fixed λ ∈ R, the integrand above attains its pointwise maximum at
fµ(y) = exp
(
g(y)− λ
2cσ2
− 1
)
f0(y).
Clearly, since g is bounded and increasing, so is ln(fµ/f0). We then find λ by
1 =
∫ ∞
−∞
fµ(y)dy =
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
(
g(y)− λ
2cσ2
− 1
)
f0(y)dy,
giving
exp
(
1 +
λ
2cσ2
)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
(
g(y)
2cσ2
)
f0(y)dy.
The formulas for fµ∗ and R
∗ = Rµ
∗
then follow.
5.4 Maximizing total effort
Let K ≥ V0 be given. We look for a purely rank-based reward function R which maximizes the
total effort
A(R) = mE(R) − x0 =
∫ ∞
−∞
ydE(R)(y)− x0,
subject to the reservation utility constraint V(R) ≥ V0 and the budget constraint
∫ 1
0 R(r)dr ≤ K.
Theorem 5.4. supR∈Rr
b
A(R) =
√
(K − V0)T/c. When K = V0, the unique optimal reward is
given by R∗(r) ≡ V0. When K > V0, as M →∞, an O(e−M/λ)-optimal reward is
RM (r) = 2cσ
2 ln ζµM (qµM (r)) + V0,
where
fµM (y) =
f0(y) exp
(
y∧M∨(−M)
λ
)
∫∞
−∞ f0(z) exp
(
z∧M∨(−M)
λ
)
dz
, λ = σ2
√
cT
K − V0 .
Proof. By Theorem 5.1, it suffices for us to look for an optimal target distribution µ satisfying
H
(
µ|N (x0, σ2T )
) ≤ K − V0
2cσ2
.
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Such a µ, if lies in E(Rrb), can be realized by the reward function R(r) = 2cσ2 ln ζµ(qµ(r))+V0. We
shall assume that we are in the nontrivial case K > V0, otherwise the only attainable equilibrium
is µ = N (x0, σ2T ) which is induced by the uniform reward. We first relax the boundedness
requirement of ln(fµ/f0); it turns out that the the relaxed optimizer fails to be in E(Rrb). We then
construct an approximate optimizer by truncation.
The relaxed optimization problem over µ reads
maximize
∫ ∞
−∞
yfµ(y)dy − x0
s.t.
∫ ∞
−∞
fµ(y)dy = 1, ln
(
fµ
f0
)
is increasing,∫ ∞
−∞
ln
(
fµ(y)
f0(y)
)
fµ(y)dy ≤ K − V0
2cσ2
.
(5.4)
Any candidate optimizer fµ∗ necessarily satisfies the Kuhn–Tucker conditions (see e.g. Luenberger
[19])
y = λ1 + λ2
(
1 + ln
(
fµ∗(y)
f0(y)
))
∫ ∞
−∞
fµ∗(y)dy = 1,
∫ ∞
−∞
ln
(
fµ∗(y)
f0(y)
)
fµ∗(y)dy ≤ K − V0
2cσ2
, λ2 ≥ 0,
λ2
(∫ ∞
−∞
ln
(
fµ∗(y)
f0(y)
)
fµ∗(y)dy − K − V0
2cσ2
)
= 0.
The above implies
fµ∗(y) =
1
σ
√
T
ϕ
(
y − (x0 + σ2T/λ2)
σ
√
T
)
and
ln
(
fµ∗(y)
f0(y)
)
=
y − x0
λ2
− σ
2T
2λ22
,
where λ2 > 0 is determined by the complementary slackness
H
(
µ∗|N (x0, σ2T )
)
=
σ2T
2λ22
=
K − V0
2cσ2
,
giving λ2 = σ
2
√
cT/(K − V0). We then have
fµ∗(y) =
1
σ
√
T
ϕ
(
y − (x0 +
√
(K − V0)T/c)
σ
√
T
)
.
In other words, µ∗ = N (x0+
√
(K − V0)T/c, σ2T ). It is also clear that ln fµ∗(y)/f0(y) is increasing.
Since the objective and the equality constraints are linear in fµ, and the inequality constraint is
convex in fµ, it can also be shown that these conditions, together with the monotonicity of ln fµ∗/f0,
are sufficient for optimality. The relaxed optimal value equals
√
(K − V0)T/c ≥ supR∈Rr
b
A(R).
Since ln fµ∗/f0 is unbounded, such a µ
∗ /∈ Rrb . Consider the truncated µM defined in the
theorem statement. We have RM ∈ Rrb and µM = E(RM ) for all M . Moreover, let
hM (y) := f0(y) exp
(
y ∧M ∨ (−M)
λ2
− x0
λ2
− σ
2T
2λ22
)
.
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We can show that ∫ ∞
−∞
hM (y)dy =
∫ ∞
−∞
fµ∗(y)dy +O(e
−M/λ2) = 1 +O(e−M/λ2)
and ∫ ∞
−∞
yhM (y)dy =
∫ ∞
−∞
yfµ∗(y)dy +O(e
−M/λ2) = x0 +
√
(K − V0)T/c+O(e−M/λ2)
as M →∞. It follows that
A(RM ) =
∫∞
−∞ yhM (y)dy∫∞
−∞ hM (z)dz
− x0
=
x0 +
√
(K − V0)T/c +O(e−M/λ2)
1 +O(e−M/λ2)
− x0 =
√
(K − V0)T/c +O(e−M/λ2).
Remark 5.2. It can be verified using Theorem 3.1 that µ∗ = N (x0 +
√
(K − V0)T/c, σ2T ) is an
equilibrium induced by the unbounded reward
R∗(r) = 2cσ2 ln ζµ∗(qµ∗(r)) + V0 = 2
√
(K − V0)c
T
(qµ∗(r)− x0)−K + 2V0
= K + 2σ
√
c(K − V0)N−1(r).
The optimal effort process associated with µ∗ is constant: a∗s ≡
√
K−V0
cT , by straightforward calcu-
lation using (2.10). This can also be seen by directly substituting
R∗µ∗(x) = 2
√
(K − V0)c
T
(x− x0)−K + 2V0
into the control problem, yielding a linear-quadratic optimization:
sup
a
E
[
R∗µ∗
(
x0 +
∫ T
0
atdt
)
−
∫ T
0
ca2t dt
]
= sup
a
E
[∫ T
0
(
2
√
(K − V0)c
T
at − ca2t
)
dt
]
−K + 2V0.
However, it is not clear whether µ∗ is the unique equilibrium under R∗.
6 Price of anarchy
For a fixed reward function R, the price of anarchy (PoA) is defined as the ratio between the
optimal centralized welfare Vc and the worst equilibrium welfare/game value. By centralized, we
mean that the principal can prescribe and enforce the effort, or equivalently, the law of the controlled
process, for the agents. We only consider a symmetric effort prescription, i.e. same terminal law for
all players. To avoid triviality, we consider R that is not purely rank-based, otherwise the optimal
centralized welfare is always equal to
∫ 1
0 R(r)dr which is attained by prescribing zero effort for all.
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The optimal centralized welfare Vc is defined as
Vc := sup
a
E
[
RL(XT )(XT )−
∫ T
0
ca2t dt
]
.
This is a control problem of McKean-Vlasov type. Similar to the derivation of (2.6), we can
reformulate the centralized problem as
Vc = sup
µ∈P(R):µ∼PT
∫
R
{
R
(
x, Fµ(x),
∫
R
ydµ(y)
)
− 2cσ2 ln
(
dµ
dN (x0, σ2T )
)
(x)
}
dµ(x)
= sup
m∈R
sup
µ∈P(R):µ∼PT∫
R
ydµ(y)=m
∫
R
{
R (x, Fµ(x),m)− 2cσ2 ln
(
dµ
dN (x0, σ2T )
)
(x)
}
dµ(x).
When R(x, r,m) is independent of individual performance x, the inner optimization over µ is
explicitly solvable. Specifically, letting Π(m) :=
∫ 1
0 R(r,m)dr, we have
Vc = sup
m
{
Π(m)− 2cσ2 inf
µ:µ∼PT ,
∫
R
ydµ(y)=m
∫
R
ln
(
dµ
dN (x0, σ2T )
)
(x)dµ(x)
}
.
Here and in the sequel, we omit the underlying assumption that m ∈ R and µ ∈ P(R). Using
the Lagrange method, we find that the mean-constrained entropy minimization has optimal value
(m−x0)2
2σ2T
, attained by the normal distribution µ∗ = N (m,σ2T ). It follows that
Vc = sup
m
{
Π(m)− c
T
(m− x0)2
}
. (6.1)
We see that Vc <∞ if Π(m) has sub-quadratic growth. As one would expect for a symmetric game,
the centralized solution does not depend on the rank-order allocation of rewards.
When R(x, r,m) is independent of rank r, we have
Vc = sup
m
sup
µ:
∫
R
ydµ(y)=m
∫
R
{
R (x,m)− 2cσ2 ln
(
dµ
dN (x0, σ2T )
)
(x)
}
dµ(x).
Again by the Lagrange method, we find that the inner maximization over µ has solution
fµ(m)(x) =
f0(x) exp
(
R(x,m)−λmx
2cσ2
)
∫
R
f0(y) exp
(
R(y,m)−λmy
2cσ2
)
dy
,
where λm is determined by
m =
∫
R
xf0(x) exp
(
R(x,m)−λmx
2cσ2
)
dx∫
R
f0(y) exp
(
R(y,m)−λmy
2cσ2
)
dy
.
Plugging in fµ(m) into the formula for Vc, we get
Vc = sup
m
{
λmm+ 2cσ
2 ln
(∫
R
f0(y) exp
(
R(y,m)− λmy
2cσ2
)
dy
)}
. (6.2)
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Example 6.1. Suppose R(r,m) = m + 2σ
√
c(1− α)mN−1(r) with α ∈ (0, 1]. Note that R(r,m)
takes the same form as the effort-maximizing reward in Remark 5.2 with K replaced by m and V0
by αm. In this case, we have Π(m) = m and by (6.1),
Vc = sup
m
{
m− c
T
(m− x0)2
}
= x0 +
T
4c
.
To compute the equilibrium welfare, observe that given µ ∈ P(R) with ∫
R
xdµ(x) = mµ. Let
R˜(r) := R(r,mµ), then µ is an equilibrium for R if and only if µ is optimal for V (R,µ) = V (R˜, µ),
which means µ is also the unique equilibrium for the purely rank-based reward R˜. This allows us
to directly use Remark 5.2 to write down one equilibrium µ (not necessarily unique), whose mean
satisfies
mµ = x0 +
√
(1− α)mµT
c
.
The unique solution is given by
mµ = x0 +
(1− α)T
2c
+
1
2c
√
(1− α)2T 2 + 4cx0(1− α)T ,
with associated game value αmµ. It follows that in this case,
PoA ≥ x0 +
T
4c
αmµ
.
When α → 0, PoA→ ∞. When α = 1, PoA≥ 1 + T4cx0 . When αmµ = x0 + T4c or α = T+4cx02T+4cx0 ,
PoA≥ 1. If we only consider equilibria that satisfy β(µ) <∞, then all inequalities become equalities.
Example 6.2. Suppose R(x,m) = αx+(1−α)g(m) where g is bounded increasing, and α ∈ [0, 1].
In this case, it can be shown that µ(m) = N (m,σ2T ), m = x0 + T2c(α− λm), and∫
R
f0(y) exp
(
R(y,m)− λmy
2cσ2
)
dy = exp
(
(1− α)Π(m) + cT (m2 − x20)
2cσ2
)
.
By (6.2), we get
Vc = sup
m
{
αm+ (1− α)g(m) − c
T
(m− x0)2
}
.
Since R is independent of rank and linear in x, we have that β(µ) < ∞ for all µ ∈ P(R). By
Theorem 3.1, all equilibria are characterized by (3.1). We find that there is a unique equilibrium µ
which is normal with mean mµ = x0 +
Tα
2c and variance σ
2T ). The associated game value is
2cσ2 ln
(∫
R
f0(y) exp
(
R(y,mµ)
2cσ2
)
dy
)
= (1− α)g(mµ) + c
T
(m2µ − x20).
It follows that, after rearranging the denominator,
PoA =
supm
{
αm+ (1− α)g(m) − cT (m− x0)2
}
αmµ + (1− α)g(mµ)− cT (mµ − x0)2
.
When α = 0, PoA=supm
{
g(m)− cT (m− x0)2
}
/g(x0). When α = 1, the game is non-interactive,
and PoA= 1.
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A Schro¨dinger bridges from space to time
Let Ω = C([0, T ],R) be the canonical space and Wx be the Wiener measure starting at x at
time zero. Also let (Ft)t∈[0,T ] be the filtration generated by the canonical process. Define τ(ω) :=
inf{t ∈ [0, T ] : wt = 0} with the convention that inf ∅ =∞. Given a reference measure P ∈ P(Ω), a
source distribution ν ∈ P(R) and a target distribution µ ∈ P(T) where T := [0, T ]∪ {∞}, consider
the following variant of the Schro¨dinger bridge problem:
inf
Q∈P(Ω)
H(Q|P ) subject to Q0 = ν, Q ◦ τ−1 = µ.
For any Q ∈ P(Ω), define Qx,t := Q(·|ω0 = x, τ(ω) = t). We have the disintegration:
Q(·) =
∫
R×T
Qx,t(·)π(dx, dt), π = Q ◦ (ω0, τ)−1.
Similar to the standard Schro¨dinger bridge problem, one can show that the optimal transport plan
is given by
Q∗ =
∫
R×T
P x,t(·)π∗(dx, dt),
where π∗ is the solution to
inf
pi∈P(R×T)
H(π|P ◦ (ω0, τ)−1) subject to π0 = ν, π1 = µ,
assuming the infimum is attained.
Now, consider the hitting time ranking game of Bayraktar et al. [1], where each agent solves
Vˆ = sup
a
E
[
Rµ˜(τ)−
∫ τ∧T
0
ca2t dt
]
, τ = inf
{
t ≥ 0 : x0 −
∫ t
0
asds+ σBs = 0
}
.
Here it is assumed that Rµ˜(t) = R∞ ∈ R for all t > T . Take X = x0 + σωt and P = W0 ◦X−1,
and identify at with the set of laws
Q :=
{
Q ∈ P(Ω) : Q ∼ P, dQ
dP
=
dQ
dP
∣∣∣∣
Fτ∧T
}
.
The condition on the Radon-Nikodym derivative means at ≡ 0 for all t > τ ∧ T . Let µ0 := P ◦ τ−1
be the law of the first passage time of level x0/σ of a Brownian motion. We can rewrite the agent’s
control problem in weak formulation as
Vˆ = sup
Q∈Q
EQRµ˜(τ)− 2cσ2H(Q|P )
= sup
µ∼µ0
sup
Q∈Q:Q◦τ−1=µ
∫
T
Rµ˜(x)dµ(x)− 2cσ2H(Q|P )
≤ sup
µ∼µ0
∫
T
Rµ˜(t)dµ(t) − 2cσ2 inf
Q∈P(Ω):Q0=δx0 , Q◦τ
−1=µ
H(Q|P )
= sup
µ∼µ0
∫
T
Rµ˜(t)dµ(t) − 2cσ2 inf
pi∈P(R×T): pi0=δx0 , pi1=µ
H(π|P ◦ (ω0, τ)−1)
= sup
µ∼µ0
∫
T
Rµ˜(t)dµ(t) − 2cσ2H(µ|µ0)
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Note that for each µ ∼ µ0, the associated optimal Q = Qµ =
∫
T
P x0,t(·)µ(dt) is always equivalent to
P and satisfies dQ/dP = ζ(τ) ∈ Fτ∧T , where ζ(t) := dµ(t)/dµ0(t). It follows that Q ∈ Q and the
inequality is in fact an equality. The resulting static problem can be further split into a constrained
calculus of variation problem, followed by a static optimization:
Vˆ = sup
β∈(0,1)
sup
fµ|[0,T ]>0,
∫ T
0
fµ(t)dt=β
∫ T
0
{
Rµ˜(t)− 2cσ2 ln
(
fµ(t)
fµ0(t)
)}
fµ(t)dt
+R∞(1− β)− 2cσ2(1− β) ln
(
1− β
1− Fµ0(T )
)
.
By elementary calculation, one deduces the same formula as Bayraktar et al. [1, Eq. (2.5)].
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